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Abstract
Face de-identification has become increasingly impor-
tant as the image sources are explosively growing and eas-
ily accessible. The advance of new face recognition tech-
niques also arises peoples concern regarding the privacy
leakage. The mainstream pipelines of face de-identification
are mostly based on the k-same framework, which bears
critiques of low effectiveness and poor visual quality. In
this paper, we propose a new framework called Privacy-
Protective-GAN (PP-GAN) that adapts GAN with novel
verificator and regulator modules specially designed for
the face de-identification problem to ensure generating de-
identified output with retained structure similarity accord-
ing to a single input. We evaluate the proposed approach in
terms of privacy protection, utility preservation, and struc-
ture similarity. Our approach not only outperforms existing
face de-identification techniques but also provides a prac-
tical framework of adapting GAN with priors of domain
knowledge.
1. Introduction
Beneficial from the blooming development of media and
network techniques that makes huge amount of images
more approachable, image analysis techniques bear its pros-
perity in the past decade and brings unprecedented conve-
nience to our daily life. Among those image sources ex-
posed to the public with or without our awareness, a con-
siderable number of them contain our identity especially the
biometric information. Not only will the unprotected ex-
posing cause the leak of privacy, the common approaches of
protection like blurring and pixelization may also not be sat-
isfied in thwarting face recognition software [22, 24]. The
other extreme side is that we simply mask identity area off,
which is perfect for identity removal. But it causes serious
loss of data utility in application of visual understanding
as the scene information is changed with objects removal.
Thus it is critically important to build a framework that can
properly de-identify the privacy information from the image
while keeping its utility at the same time.
Figure 1. Illustration of face de-identification. The top row
shows the original face images, the bottom row represents corre-
sponding de-identified images synthesized by our method.
Specially for the face de-identification problem, the
dilemma is that on the one hand, we want the de-identified
image to look as different as possible from the original im-
age to ensure the removal of identity; on the other hand, we
expect the de-identified image to retain as much structural
information in the original image as possible so that the im-
age utility remains. Previous approaches on this problem
are mostly based on k-same algorithm [9, 11, 12, 22] for the
de-identificatin procedure and some apply additional mod-
els like the Active Appearance Models (AAMs) [19] to ex-
plicitly construct faces preserving the utility attributes like
gender, race, and age [6, 16]. Yet these models fail to make
full use of existing data and deliver fairly poor visual quality
due to the unnatural synthesis.
The Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) provide
an inspiring framework on generating sharp and realistic
natural image samples via adversarial training [8, 15, 35].
GAN can be naturally used for the face de-identification
as it can generate new samples from the gallery follow-
ing original input data distribution. Since GAN implicitly
models a dataset distribution, it cannot involve processing
individual images. To achieve an image-to-image face de-
identification, conditinal GAN (cGAN) is intuitively lever-
aged here, which is an extention of GAN that fits a condi-
tional data distribution [21].
Unfortunately, cGAN is not directly applicable to our
scenario, which requires privacy protection as well as data
utility preservation. First, the generative loss in cGAN is
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not specific for distinguishing identities, thus the generated
samples could be either too similar with each other to pass
external face verification, or visually ghosted as none-faces.
Second, the structure information is unensured to be pre-
served due to the inconsistency in feature spaces between
GAN-type and structural losses.
Thus to make an adaptive GAN framework for the de-
identification problem, we introduce additional mechanisms
to enlarge the sampling range away from the given samples
in the identity-related embedding feature space properly and
to constrain the variation of the part of image structure from
the full image feature space simultaneously. When unified
in the GAN loss, these two tasks are actually contradictory
to each other because the GAN loss is unable to explicitly
tell the embedding feature from the structure feature and
they contribute to the performance of distinguishing two
faces in the same direction. Thus here we explicitly express
them as external losses to compensate their contradiction in
GAN and consequently achieve a novel Privacy-Protective-
GAN model (PP-GAN, see Figure. 2), which can plausibly
balance between id-removal and structure retains.
Indeed, in our PP-GAN model, we introduce two addi-
tional types of external modules: the verificator with con-
trastive loss [13] to allow cGAN’s generator for a larger
range of sampling exploration, and the regulator with Struc-
tural Similarity Index (SSIM) [31] to account for the struc-
ture preservation. Intuitively, the verificator adds prior in-
formation of identity feature matching in the embedding
space to help remove biometic information while the regula-
tor tells the generator how to maintain similar image utility
via luminance, contrast and structural similarities. The in-
volvement of these two prior knowledge on what is identity
information versus the structure information significantly
improve the model performance.
In the experimental setting, we quantitatively demon-
strate the effectiveness of proposed method in several as-
pects: (i) The generative de-identified image can thwart the
face verificator; (ii) The de-identified image is not simply
switched with others in the training data; (iii) The lumi-
nance, contrast and structure can be partially preserved and
(iv) The attributes utility can be preserved when training an
attribute specific generator.
In summary, our contributions are as following:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to pro-
pose a GAN-based framework that is trainable in an end-
to-end manner directly for the face de-identification task.
The integrated framework can synthesize de-identified out-
put for each single probe face.
• We manage to balance the trade-off between image
quality and privacy protection by introducing novel mod-
ules, the verificator and the reglulator. The model learns
to retain the structure similarity with the original image on
the pix level, while distinguishes the input and synthesized
output in the identity-related feature space. It is the first
time that a de-identification metric is properly aggregated
into the objective function in a controllable and measur-
able manner, which largely ensured the effectiveness of de-
identification and privacy protection.
• We are the first to propose a systematic plan of eval-
uating the results of de-identification, where we employ a
state-of-the-art face verificator [27] to determine the de-
identification rate and the a face detector [34] to quantify the
detection rate. These two measurements combinely indicate
how well the de-identification procedure works in its tar-
get of with utility retained. The proposed method achieves
100% de-identification rate and obtains best trade-off be-
tween identity removal and visual similarity.
The rest of the paper is orgnaized as following: Related
works about de-identification task are summarized in Sec-
tion 2; In the Section 3, we introduce our PP-GAN frame-
work; A quantitative evaluation on a public dataset as well
as visual illustrations are provided in Section 4; The paper
concludes with a discussion in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Privacy protection in visual data has been drawing in-
creasing amount of research attention recently, with focuses
on different scenarios such as video analysis and security
and sampled studies in [28, 3, 32, 2, 5]
Face de-identification is an important tool for visual pri-
vacy protection. The goal of face de-identification has two
folds: privacy protection and data utility preservation. In
such way, de-identified images conceal the identity privacy
of the original image, while preserving non-identity-related
aspects for further data analysis. Earlier works on face
de-identification simply use masking, blurring or pixelation
[24]. While these Ad Hoc methods are easily applicable, it
is shown that they provide no privacy assurance since they
may fail to thwart face recognition software [10]. Moreover,
how to conduct a sufficient blur itself is non-trivial [7].
To address this problem, Newton et al. [22] propose
the k-same algorithm based on the k-anonymity concept
[30]. By applying the k-same algorithm, a given image
is represented by average face of k-closet faces from the
gallery. This procedure theoretically limits the performance
of recognition to 1/k, but usually suffers from ghosting ar-
tifacts in de-identified images. Some variants of k-same
are proposed to improve the data utility and the natural-
ness of de-identified face images. The k-Same-Select al-
gorithm [9] partitions the image set into mutually exclusive
subsets and applies the k-same algorithm independently to
each subsets, in this way attempts to preserve attributes of
each subset. In order to overcome undesirable artifacts due
to misalignments and produce de-identified images of bet-
ter quality, the k-same-M algorithm [11] based on Active
Appearance Models (AAMs) [19] is proposed. This algo-
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rithm fits an AAM to input images then applies k-same to
the AAM model parameters. To further keep the data prac-
tically useful, Du et al. explicitly preserve race, gender and
age attributes in face de-identification [6]. Jourabloo et al.
propose to jointly model face de-identification and attribute
preservation in a unified optimization framework [16].
The majority of sate-of-the-art approaches are designed
based on the k-same and implemented using AAM models.
However, these methods have notable limitations: (i) The
k-same assumes that each subject is only represented once
in the dataset, but this may be violated in practice. The
presence of multiple images from same subject or images
share similar biometric characteristics can lead to lower lev-
els of privacy protection; (ii) k-same operates on a closed
set and produces a corresponding de-identified set, which is
not applicable in situations that involve processing individ-
ual images or sequences of images; (iii) Generated images
by AAM models do not yet look natural enough.
Recently, GANs present promising effectiveness on im-
age generating problems. It is a natural tool to synthesize
de-identified images. Karlaet al. [1] build a GAN-based
model to generate full body images for de-identification, but
the quality in face areas is not guaranteed. Blazˇ et al. use
GAN to synthesize de-identified faces, but still based on the
k-same algorithm [20].
In this paper, we only focus on biometric information,
i.e., we do not remove soft biometric features like age or
race and non-biometric information like hairstyles [24]. We
propose a novel Privacy-Protective-GAN framework to ad-
dress the problems mentioned above.
3. Method
Face de-identification can be formulated as a transfor-
mation function δ which maps a given face image x to
a de-identified image xˆ, i.e. δ(x) = xˆ, aiming to mis-
leading the face verification. In this work, we propose a
PP-GAN model and adopt the final generator as the de-
identification function. First, we pretrain a verificator to de-
termine whether two faces are from the same subject. Next,
we freeze this verificator and utilize it to compute the con-
trastive loss in the whole system training phase. In each
iteration, the synthesized output and the original image will
be forwarded in: 1) the identity-related feature space by the
pre-trained verificator to enforce the removal of identity;
2) the pixel level structure similarity by SSIM to preserve
visual correspondence. Then the contrastive loss and the
SSIM loss will be backpropagated to update the generator.
Fig. 2 gives the big picture of the whole framework.
In the following subsections, we will describe the struc-
ture of the PP-GAN and explain its learning procedure in
detail. The overview of the whole system is illustrated in
Section 3.1. The detailed explanations of the Generator v.s.
Discriminator are given in Section 3.2. The verificator and
structure similarity are introduced in Sections 3.3 and 3.4
respectively.
3.1. Objective
Face de-identification is a complex task involving multi-
ple constraints at the same time. Specially, given an original
face, we generate a new face image accordingly and hope
that it meets three types of qualification: 1) The generated
face should look natural and realistic, i.e. it looks like a
face; 2) The generated face should not be discriminated as
the same person with the original face, i.e. it should be far
enough from the original one in the identity-related feature
space; 3) The de-identified image should be consistent with
the original image on the pixel level as much as possible,
i.e., it shares similar luminance, contrast, and structure with
the original image.
For the first objective, it can be achieved by utilizing the
cGAN, which adversarially trains a generator (G) taking the
original image as input and producing de-identified images
versus the co-trained discriminator (D). The cGAN loss is
denoted as LcGAN(G,D) here. The details of cGAN set-
tings will be clarified in Section 3.2.
For the second goal, we pre-train a verificator to pro-
duce a verification loss in the identity embedding space for
each pair of original and de-identified images. The veri-
fication loss for each generator G is then formularized as
the expected loss across subjects and denoted as Lverif(G).
This is used to guide the generator to enforce that the out-
put holds an enough distance with the input in the identity-
related feature space. The details about verificator will be
elaborated in Section 3.3.
For the third objective, we adopt the Structural Similar-
ity Index (SSIM) [31] to quantify the similarity between the
original and generated images. The SSIM loss combines the
luminance, contrast, and structural differences in a product
form with different power coefficients. Similarly as the ver-
ification loss, the SSIM loss for the generator G is then for-
mularized as the expected loss across subjects and denoted
as Lsim(G). The details of structure loss will be discussed
in Section 3.4.
Combining these three types of losses, our final objective
of face de-identification is defined as
Lface(G,D)
=LcGAN(G,D) + λ1Lverif(G) + λ2Lsim(G),
(1)
and the optimal generatorG∗ is solved through the min-max
procedure
G∗ = argmin
G
max
D
Lface(G,D), (2)
where λ1 and λ2 are the hyperparameters for multiple
losses.
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Figure 2. The Structure of the Privacy-Protective-GAN (PP-GAN) Framework. The PP-GAN framework consists of four components:
generator, discriminator, verificator, and regulator. (a) The generator is a “U-Net” based auto-encoder, synthesizing a de-identified image
xˆ for given original image xˆ. (b) The discriminator is adversarially trained with the generator to encourage the output to be sharp and
realistic. (c) The verifiactor is to determine whether two faces are from the same person. (d) The regulator is to determine how similar the
two faces are in pixel level.
3.2. Architecture of GAN
The cGAN learns a mapping G : {x, z} → xˆ from an
observed image x with additional random noise z to a syn-
thesized image xˆ, where x is referred as a ‘real’ sample or
the condition from the original dataset, xˆ is referred as a
‘fake’ sample generated by the trained generator G, and z
is the random noise to ensure the image variability. The
adversarial procedure trains a generator to produce outputs
that can hardly be distinguished as a ‘fake’ by the co-trained
discriminator (D). Mathematically, the objective function
of the cGAN is expressed as
LcGAN(G,D) = Ex,xˆ∼Pdata(x,xˆ)[logD(x, xˆ)]+
Ex∼Pdata(x),z∼Pz(z)[log(1−D(x,G(x, z))],
(3)
where G is the generator and D is the discriminator. The
optimal G∗ minimizes this objective against an adversarial
D that maximizes it, and it can be solved via a min-max
procedure G∗ = argminG maxD LcGAN(G,D).
In practice, we adapt our generator and discriminator ar-
chitectures from the Image-to-Image translation [15]. As
shown in Fig. 2, both of them use modules consisting of
Convolution-BatchNorm-ReLu [14]. The generator is a “U-
Net” [26] by adding skip connections between symmet-
ric layers in the convolution and deconvolution steps. The
stride keeps to be 2 so it resizes by 2 in the encoding part,
expands by 2 in the decoding part. The size of the em-
bedding layer is 1 × 1. Two drop-out layers in the mid-
dle serve as random noise z. For the discriminator, instead
of feeding it with ‘real’ or ‘fake’ pairs, we follow the stan-
dard approach from [8] and input either ‘real’ image x or
‘fake’ image xˆ since there is no unique solution for the de-
identified G(x). Also, a patch-design [15] is adopted in the
discriminator thus it outputs a N × N patch, rather than a
single value to represent the probability of current input to
be ”real”. Here we set N to 30 with receptive field of size
34. The network architectures are shown in Fig. 3.
3.3. Face Verification
Face verification is to determine whether two images ex-
press the same person. Metric learning is a widely used
approach for this task, which learns semantic distance mea-
surements and the associated embeddings [4, 29, 27, 23]
from the original image space to feature space. Motivated
by FaceNet [27], we strive for an embedding f(x) so that
the squared distance between all faces are independent of
imaging conditions. In the embedding spaces, samples with
the same identity are closer whereas those with different
identities are further apart.
Mathematically, the embedding is denoted as f :
data→ Rd, which embeds an image x into a d-dimensional
Euclidean space. We adopt the following contrastive loss
function originally proposed by Hadsell et al. [13]. The loss
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Figure 3. The network architecture of the generator G and the discriminator D. The generator has a “U-net” architecture with input
size of 1× 128× 128, embedding size of 256× 1× 1, and output size that is consistent with the input size. The input size of discriminator
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function is defined as
Verif(xi, xj , ηxi,xj , α) =
1
2
‖f(xi)− f(xj)‖22 , if ηxi,xj = 0
1
2
max
(
0, α− ‖f(xi)− f(xj)‖2
)2
, if ηxi,xj = 1
(4)
where α is the margin that is enforced between positive and
negative pairs, f is the embedding function, and ηxi,xj is
the indicator where ηxi,xj = 0 means positive pairs, and
ηxi,xj = 1 means negative pairs.
For the network architecture, we choose the new Light
CNN-9 model [33], which introduces the MaxFeature-Map
(MFM) operation as an alternative of ReLU and claims that
the MFM can play a role of feature selection. With this
design, the Light CNN-9 model achieves state-of-the-art re-
sults with less parameters and time-consumption. The Light
CNN-9 model contains 5 convolution layers, 4 Network in
Network (NIN) layers [18], Max-Feature-Map function and
4 max-pooling layers. The final layer is a fully connected
one that outputs a 256-dimensional representation. A de-
tailed explanation of this architecture can be found in [33].
In the pre-training phase of the verificator, we randomly
sample 50% positive and 50% negative pairs as train data
to avoid data unbalance. These pairs are separately fed to
a shared weight Siamese network, where the model is up-
dated by the contrastive loss defined in Eq. (4). Once the
verificator training is finished, parameters are frozen in the
whole system training followed.
Next in the PP-GAN training phase, the pair of original
image x and synthesized image xˆ are fed into pre-trained
verificator with ηx,xˆ = 1 to enforce their different identities,
i.e., the de-identification.
The term of verification loss in Eq. (1) is then defined as
Lverif(G)
= Ex∼Pdata(x),z∼Pz [Verif(x,G(x, z), η, α)] ,
(5)
where x is the original input I , z is the noise, G(x, z) is the
generated image, η = 1 is the always false indicator, and
the margin is set to 2 on the normalized feature vector to
enforce a positive loss.
3.4. Structure Similarity
For the de-identification problem, we want to hold the
correspondence between original image x and synthesized
image xˆ. The vanilla GAN simply generates new samples
from the data distribution. For cGAN, although it samples
under the condition of the input image x, it does not en-
sure that the synthesized image xˆ is close enough to x in
the image space. For example, if we have two images xi
and xj with the same condition, the cGAN would generate
xˆi and xˆj with the same distribution so that we cannot tell
whether xˆi is the de-identified image from xi or xj . Thus
an additional structural loss is necessary here to regulate the
generator to assure this matching. The two popular choices,
the mean squared error (MSE) and the related quantity of
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), are not well suited be-
cause they do not match very well to the perceived visual
quality by humans, and the pixel-level matching with the
reference image is not what we want to optimize. Instead
we use the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [31] as an ob-
jective measurement for assessing perceptual image degra-
dation after de-identification.
SSIM consists of three components including luminance
similarity l(x, xˆ), contrast similarity c(x, xˆ) and structural
similarity s(x, xˆ):
SSIM(x, xˆ) = l(x, xˆ)α · c(x, xˆ)β · s(x, xˆ)γ (6)
For a detailed explanation of SSIM, one can refer to [31].
Here we define Lsim(x, xˆ) = 12 (1 − SSIM(x, xˆ)). Then in
the GAN training, we have
Lsim(G) = Ex,∼Pdata(x),z∼Pz
[1
2
(
1− SSIM(x,G(x, z))],
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Figure 4. The demographic distribution of the MORPH
dataset. The black group contains more samples than the white
group, while both have the similar age distribution.
where z is the noise, and G(x, z) is the generated image.
4. Experiments
4.1. experimental Setup
We evaluate the proposed framework on a publicly avail-
able MORPH [25] dataset, which contains 55,000 unique
images of more than 13,000 individuals, with diverse de-
mographic information like age, gender, and race. Here we
only use male data since the number of femalel subjects is
limited. The details of the demographic distribution in the
MORPH dataset are shown in Fig. 4.
To validate that our framework can preserve attributes
utility, data is divided into black and white according to
race, then we divide each category into three age groups:
youth (age 6 25), middle-aged (25 < age < 40) and se-
nior (age > 40). We refer these 8 different data groups
as Black, White, Black-Youth, Black-Middle, Black-Senior,
White-Youth, White-Middle and White-Senior. We ran-
domly pick 90% from each group for training and use the
remaining for testing. The training and testing sets are con-
sistent in the verificator pretraining and the whole system
training. For the data preprocessing, we use OpenFace1 to
detect, align, and crop face areas. During Verificator pre-
training, we set initial learning rate as 1e-4 and margin as
2. During the whole system training, the learning rate is set
to be 1e-5. For all the experiments, we use minibatch SGD
and apply the Adam solver [17].
For each group, we separately conduct four experiments
to analyze our objective function: only use cGAN, cGAN
with SSIM loss, cGAN with pretrained verificator, amd
cGAN with both pretrained verificator and SSIM constraint
(i.e. ours). Here we refer these different set-ups as: cGAN-
only, cGAN+Sim, cGAN+Verif, and cGAN+Sim+Verif.
4.2. Privacy Protection
To demonstrate the proposed framework successfully
generates face images for privacy protection, we need to
1https://cmusatyalab.github.io/openface
Table 1. De-identification rate (percent) of Male/Black.
Black Black-Youth Black-Middle Black-Senior
Original Test 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.7
De-identified Train 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.2
De-identified Test 100.0 100.0 97.0 93.7
Table 2. De-identification rate (percent) of Male/White.
White White-Youth White-Middle White-Senior
Original Test 1.8 2.8 3.3 5.9
De-identified Train 100.0 96.2 89.7 91.7
De-identified Test 100.0 94.4 90.8 84.7
prove that the produced face images neither remain the
same as the corresponding raw images, which means suc-
cessful de-identification, nor simply changing the identity to
other identities in dataset, which means no switching iden-
tity occurs.
De-identification To evaluate if the proposed model suc-
cessfully removes the identity of original images, we as-
sess if a pair of images are from same identity in a verifi-
cation way. Specifically, given a verificator, for each pair
of images (x, xˆ), it gives a distance value indicating the
similarity of the two images. If the value is smaller than
a threshold, the two images are treated as the same identity,
which means de-identification fails; otherwise, from dif-
ferent identities, which means de-identification successes.
Here we use de-identification rate (ERR rate) to represent
the effectiveness of privacy protection, i.e., (x, xˆ) is not de-
termined as the same person.
To eliminate the overfitting caused by the pre-trained
verificator since it guides the training of the whole system,
we fine-tune the FaceNet [27]2 with triplet loss as our evalu-
ation verificator. The FaceNet is trained on the 8 subgroups
respectively. Specifically, the test data are grouped into nu-
merous pairs with half positive and half negative. Then the
trained model is evaluated on these pairs of images in a 10-
fold way. The finally gained optimal threshold is utilized in
de-identification evaluation.
Table 1 and Table 2 show our de-identification perfor-
mance. The FaceNet achieves accuracy greater than 97%
on all Black groups and 94% on White groups. The over-
all de-identification rates are both very high, and that of the
black group is a bit higher due to the larger sample size.
The majority state-of-the-art de-identification algorithms
based on k-anonymity theory, and k-value will directly af-
fect the de-identification rate. The APFD algorithm [16]
shows the performance of de-identification saturates when
k = 8, and achieves the de-identification rate around 90%,
note that the Bayesian classifier used for evaluation only
achieves verification accuracy of 70%. Recently GAN-
based face de-identification achieves best de-identification
rate of 43.2% when k = 2 [20]. Thus it is obviously that
our system outperforms previous methods regrading the ef-
2https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
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Table 3. Detection rate of Male/Black.
Data Settings Black Black-Youth Black-Middle Black-Senior
Original w/o padding 0.733 0.817 0.767 0.598
De-identified w/o padding 0.719 0.847 0.715 0.570
Original w padding 0.988 0.993 0.994 0.977
De-identified w padding 0.956 0.995 0.990 0.969
Table 4. Detection rate of Male/White.
Data Settings White White-Youth White-Middle White-Senior
Original w/o padding 0.758 0.808 0.738 0.621
De-identified w/o padding 0.784 0.767 0.739 0.499
Original w padding 0.973 0.967 0.979 0.975
De-identified w padding 0.975 0.940 0.988 0.902
fectiveness of privacy protection by explicitly adding de-
identification metric into the optimization objective.
No switching-identification In addition, in order to
demonstrate the yielded image does not possess the iden-
tity of the other original images, for each generated image,
we compute its similarity, i.e., distance, with every original
image, and compare the distance of image pair (xi, xˆj) with
a threshold, where i, j are the identity of image. If the dis-
tance is smaller than the threshold and i 6= j, identification
switching occurs. If the distance is smaller than the thresh-
old and i = j, identification switching does not occur. We
use the number of identification switches (IDS) times as a
measurement.
We conduct experiments on Black-Youth and White-
Youth. As the data are unbalanced, to fairly compare the
IDS on both groups, we randomly sample same number of
people from Black-Youth test as that in White-Youth test. On
both groups, we obtain 0 IDS, which means no identifica-
tion switching occurs.
4.3. Utility Preservation
Face-like The most important point for data utility is that
the generated images should look natural and realistic, i.e,
they look like face. Here we utilize a face detector MTCNN
[34] to determine whether the generated images are face or
not. To alleviate the variance of the face detector, we con-
duct experiments on both original and generated face im-
ages. Table 3 and 4 show the detection rate on both the orig-
inal and generated data. From the tables, we note that the
detection rates on original and de-identified data are simi-
lar, proving that our system preserves the face-like utility
very well. As cropped face images are not suitable for face
detector trained on face image with context, to alleviate the
effects from the inconsistency, we pad the cropped image
with 50 pixels of 0 along each axis. For some groups, the
detection rate on de-identified images is higher than that on
original images, e.g. Black-Youth. This is because some
original face images are distorted, but yielded images have
less distorted images.
Attributes Preservation To examine the performance of
the proposed model for attribute preservation, we train sep-
16.9%
32.2%
86.9% 87.3%
Black White
Age-nonspecifc Age-specific
Figure 5. Age classification accuracy. The blue bar displays the
classification accuracy of preserving attributes for age-nonspecific
group and the orange bar is for age-specific group.
ID: 325273 ID: 090616
Figure 6. The visualization of correspondence between original
and de-identified images. The top row shows the original face
images, the bottom row shows the corresponding de-identified im-
ages synthesized by our PP-GAN model.
arate classifiers for each attribute and compute the classifi-
cation accuracy for the generated images. The classification
accuracy rate is used as a measurement to evaluate experi-
mental results. From Figure 5, we can see that the age-
specific models well preserve its group attributes compared
to the age-nonspecific group. The experiments on original
images display similar comparisons.
4.4. Visual Similarity
For the de-identification problem, in addition to the util-
ity preservation, we want to hold the correspondence be-
tween original image x and synthesized image xˆ rather than
just replace the face area randomly. In other words, we
only want to remove the privacy related characteristics, but
keep the visual similarity, e.g. contours and luminous con-
dition, as much as possible. As shown in Fig. 6, the origi-
nal and generated images share consistent SSIM-consisting
features like luminance, contrast, and structure information
while distinguish in privacy related characteristics such as
the sizes and shapes of eyes, nose, and mouth. This indi-
cates the effectiveness of the regulator.
To demonstrate the proposed framework achieves both
de-identification and visual similarity, we compute id-
removal rate and SSIM of each yielded image with the cor-
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Figure 7. The trade-off between identity removal and visual similarity. The horizontal axis represents values of Structural Similarity
Index (SSIM), the vertical axis represents the de-identification rate.
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Figure 8. The visualized results of different objective designs on different groups. Our PP-GAN generates visually agreeable results
beyond all the other settings on every group.
responding original image on cGAN-only, cGAN + Verif,
cGAN + Sim, and cGAN + Verif + Sim (see Fig. 7), and dis-
play representative results (see Fig. 8). Overall, our frame-
work maintains high id-removal rate and SSIM at the same
time. One can also visually tell that the PP-GAN model
maps the original face to a different face while somewhat
keeps certain implicit relationship.
For the cGAN-only setting, it shows a high id-removal
rate with uncertain SSIM for the black (Fig. 7 Left-half ) and
a low id-removal rate with high SSIM for the white (Fig. 7
Right-half ), which may come from the different sizes of
samples. When the sample size is small, the cGAN-only
generates new images quite similar to existing one (Fig. 8
Left) and gains high SSIM. When the sample size is large,
the cGAN-only generator is able to step away from the orig-
inal figures but may generate improper visualizations (Fig. 8
Right) and provides low insurance for SSIM.
For the cGAN+Sim setting, the SSIM cost degenerates
cGAN to the same manner of cGAN with limited samples,
which functions almost as an identity mapping (Fig. 8).
Thus it holds low id-removal rate and high SSIM.
For the cGAN+Verif setting, the verification loss here
enlarges the cGAN’s sampling range thus results in a high
id-removal rate (Fig. 7), while the inconsistency between
the two feature spaces and lack of structure constrains may
cause the visually strange consequences (Fig. 8 Right). An
interesting phenomenon is that when the sample size is
small (the white group), the cGAN+Verif indeed obtains
a visually moderate result (Fig. 8 left) due to the enlarged
sampling range from the verificator.
These results confirm the necessity and efficiency of si-
multaneously including the verificator and regulator to bal-
ance the id-removal and utility retaining.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a new face de-identification
framework, Privacy-Protective-GAN, which generates de-
identified output according to a single input. We explicitly
integrate the de-identification metric into the objective func-
tion to ensure the privacy protection. Meanwhile, we try to
preserve visual similarity as much as possible to retain data
utility by adding a regulator. In the experiments, we quan-
titatively demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed method
in terms of privacy protection, utility preservation, and vi-
sual similarity.
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Figure 9. The visualized results of the black group. In each pair of double rows, the top one is for the original faces and the bottom one is
for the de-identified faces. (a) This panel shows the results for the whole black group. We can see that the age factor is not retained. The (b)
shows the results of Black-Youth subgroup. The (c) shows the results of Black-Middle subgroup. The (d) shows the results of Black-Senior
subgroup.
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Figure 10. The visualized results of the white group. In each pair of double rows, the top one is for the original faces and the bottom
one is for the de-identified faces. (a) This panel shows the results for the whole white group. We can see that the age factor is not retained.
The (b) shows the results of White-Youth subgroup. The (c) shows the results of White-Middle subgroup. The (d) shows the results of
White-Senior subgroup.
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